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ABSTRACT 
The railways of tropical Africa have undergone drastic changes in the 
past two decades. On the one hand, some major extensions and improvements have 
been made, of which the most significant is TAZARA, linking Zambia with Dar es 
Salaam. On the other hand, the near monopoly position has been shattered by the 
development of road transport, which has deflected substantial traffic that 
would otherwise have gone by rail, particularly high-value commodities. At the 
same time with emphasis on road building, the rail systems, except in Central 
Africa, have been neglected to varying degrees by governments, with a resulting 
inability even to carry all the traffic that is available, and there has been 
considerable deterioration in performance. Finally in some areas, political 
changes have either reduced traffic or resulted in major realignments of 
traffic patterns. A major consequence has been loss of profits and growing 
deficits. 
Despite the overall deterioration, however, the railroads in most tropical 
African countries continue to play a significant role in the transport picture 
rnd it is generally agreed that rail costs are lower than road transport costs 
where volume of traffic is substantial. The volume on the major routes is 
sufficiently great so that th^ lines are almost certainly economically justifiable, 
but some of the branch lines are questionable. 
In Central Africa, although the systems have been seriously affected by 
political events, much greater stress has been placed on the role of the rail-
ways than in either East or West Commonwealth Africa. There is also some 
evidence of a shift in government policy in other areas toward renewed emphasis 
on rail transport. All of the governments face a basic dilemma, however: if 
rail costs are to be kept low, volume must be maintained - yet for some traffic 
road transport offers real advantages. Earlier attempts to protect the rail-
roads by drastic road transport licensing rules have largely been abandoned. 
A distinction must be made between the traffic for which road transport offers 
such great advantage~ that it is uneconomic to keep it on rail, and the sub-
stantial amount which can move by either mode with only marginal advantages 
or disadvantages. It is difficult fc^ th<=> more free-enterprise-oriented economies 
to control the mode of transportation used; countries such as Tanzania and Zambia 
are in a much better position to ensure the allocation of traffic along optimal 
lines. 
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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RAIL AND ROAD TRANSPORT IN 
COMMONWEALTH TROPICAL AFRICA 
The railway systems of tropical Africa were products initially of 
the colonial period, with minor exceptions, being inaugurated around the turn 
of the century and progressing slowly, primarily built inward from the ports, 
without connections to adjacent countries. They were built partly for non-
economic reasons, partly to facilitate export of minerals and agricultural 
products.1 They were built cheaply, with light rails - some no more than 35 
pound - and universally with a gauge less than the 4 feet 85 inches standard 
of western Europe and North America. Primarily they are either metre or the 
1.067 metre gauge that began in the Cape Colony in South Africa. Inadequate 
as the rail lines were - they never constituted a 'system' except in the southern 
third of the continent - they were playing a significant role in the economies 
of the countries at the time of independence. Road systems, while greater in 
mileage at independence, were largely unsurfaced and unsuitable for heavy traffic 
The purpose of this paper is to survey the development of the lines 
with primary emphasis on post-independence policies, to consider the relation-
ships between rail and road transport and economic viability of the rail lines, 
and to review the studies of the effects of the railways upon economic develop-
. 2 ment. 
Emphasis is placed upon the Commonwealth countries of East and 
Central Africa and the neighbouring areas, with brief reference to Commonwealth 
West Africa. No claim is advanced that the paper reflects original research; it 
is based upon existing published material, some not widely known, and interviews 
in the respective countries in the early months of 1976. 
EAST AFRICAN RAILWAYS 
In the late 1960s, the East African Railways (E.A.R.) was the model 
railroad of tropical Africa and the developing world, with 3,300 miles of line, 
most of it in first-class condition, modern equipment, plans for complete 
dieselisation, and a heavy volume of traffic relative to most African lines. 
The first railway in tropical Africa was built in 1885 between 
Dakar and St. Louis in Senegal. 
z• A summary of regional studies of transportation in tropical Africa 
prior to 1968 is provided in African Development Bank,1968. 
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A decade later, E.A.R., as an entity, had disintegrated; the railroad is essen-
tially operated in three portions and is in the process of Becoming virtually 
three separate roads. It has lost substantial traffic and is desperately short 
of equipment to handle the traffic it has retained. But it still remains an 
important artery of commerce in East Africa and there are hopes for major improve-
ments in the constituent parts. 
The Origins 
E.A.R. was developed from three separate and originally discon-
3 
nected systems. The major route, the Uganda Railway, was built by the British, 
in part for political reasons, from the port of Mombasa, beginning in 1896, to 
link Uganda with the outside world. Track reached the site of Nairobi in 1899; 
Kisumu, the lake port, with connecting steamer service to Uganda, in 1902; and 
directly to Kampala in 1931. Major extensions were completed to Kasese, in the 
west of Uganda, in 1956, and to Pakwach, on the Nile in Northern Uganda, in 
1964. The main line, Mombasa to Kampala, is 844 miles in length; the total 
from Mombasa to Kasese, 1052. 
The second element was the Tanganyika Railway, started by the 
Germans westward from Dar es Salaam in 1905; it reached Morogoro in 1907, 
Tabora in 1912, Kigoma in 1914 to play a role in World War I, and from Tabora 
to Mwanza in 1928. This is known as the Tanganyika (now Tanzania 1 Central line. 
The third element, the first to be started, was built west from the port of 
Tanga in 1896 but did not reach Moshi until 1911 and Arusha in ia29.. This line 
was connected to the Mombasa-Nairobi main line in 1916, and the Tanzania Central 
line in 1960. 
The lines were merged in 1945 to become the East African Railways, 
an element of the East African Common Services Organisation, later the East African 
Community, and thus jointly owned by the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. 
The administrative headquarters, main repair shops, and training school were 
located in Nairobi. 
Traffic 
The total freight traffic increased steadily up to a high in the 
year of 1970, as shown in Table 1. Passenger traffic rose through 197 3 and then 
dropped slightly. 
3. Hill, 1949 and 1957, provides a detailed history of the lines; a semi-
popular but excellent volume, relating the railroad to overall development, is 
that by Miller, 1971. 
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Thus the main line Mombasa-Nairobi carries nearly three times the 
traffic of the Tanzania Central line; the Tanga line has relatively light traffic, 
as do most of the branches. 
The principal traffic categories were petroleum products (which have 
yielded about 25 per cent of the total revenue), grain, cement, sugar, coffee 
and cotton. 
Passenger traffic is substantial but a minor source of total revenue. 
As of 1973 daily service was operated Mombasa to Kampala, requiring about 38 
hours; daily service Dar es Salaam to Mwanza (and four times a week to Kigoma), 
twice a week Dar es Salaam to Arusha and to Nairobi; and service on the branches 
varying from three trains a day to a train twice a week. 
Tariffs and Rates 
In 1969, the average revenue was 18 Kenya cents per ton mile, or 
roughly 2.5 U.S. cents, compared to a figure of 1.3 cents in the United States 
in that year, but low by comparison with the light traffic railways of most 
less developed countries. But this figure is misleading in view of the wide 
range of rates under the differential tariff. The development and nature of 
East African tariffs has been analysed in detail by Arthur Hazlewood (1964). 
The tariff originally was built entirely on a value of service basis, with the 
deliberate objective of aiding exports and placing high rates on imported goods, 
with rates ranging at one time as high as a shilling per ton mile. As early as 
the 1930s the development of road transport led to some squeezing together of 
the rates, but as of 1960 the rates charged ranged from 13.2 E.'A. cents on export 
traffic to 36.5 E.A. cents for top rated commodities per ton mile on medium 
distances. The range in 1969 was 10.9 E.A. (Kenya) cents to 38.5 E.A. cents. 
While the intent was to aid exports - as a form of export subsidy - Hazlewood 
concluded that, given cost differences (the relatively low cost of handling the 
bulk commodity exports), there was in fact no 'subsidisation' of most export 
crops. 
By the late 1960s it was recognised that the rate structure was obso-
lete,and lengthy studies were undertaken to revise the structure in line with costs, 
to which little attention had been paid in earlier years. But progress was slow; 
the governments, particularly that of Tanzania, wanted retention of low rates 
on fertiliser, maize and livestock, and Tanzania was unwilling to approve changes 
until it received concessions on greater regionalisation of the system. One 
consequence of the delay was that rates were virtually frozen from 1969 to 1974 
^ • The monetary units of the three countries, which are kept at par, are 
the successors to the East African currency unit. 
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despite sharp increases in costs, particularly of fuel. 
Ultimately, basic changes were agreed upon. First, the taper 
for distance was revised drastically. The Hazlewood studies showed that the 
taper was not nearly steep enough initially (with the short distance rates too 
low), but continued much too far, on the basis of costs 0-964, chapter 7). 
Thus the rates on short hauls were raised sharply. Secondly, the differential 
between the high rates and low rates was reduced, with the attempt to raise the 
rates for commodities which had been below cost and to reduce the top rated 
goods to lessen road transport competition. Finally, lower rates were provided 
for large volume shipments to provide incentive to ship in larger amounts. 
The general effect was to shift substantially from a value of service oriented 
tariff structure to one more closely related to costs, and to raise the overall 
level in view of higher fuel costs. The net effect of the change was to cause 
some loss in traffic but to raise revenues. There still remains considerable 
differential among commodities, some based upon value of service. 
After deficits in early years of the constituent parts, East African 
Railways earned a profit continuously up until 1967 , when small deficits began 
5 
to occur. But basically the system was much more successful financially than 
that of many developed, as well as lesser developed, countries. But it was 
generally believed that profits from the heavily used Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala 
line subsidised the lighter traffic on the Tanzania Central and Tanga lines. 
Rail Operations 
The system was operating as of 1960 with a wide variety of steam 
locomotives, from ones dating back to the German days in Tanganyika to a group 
of Beyer-Garretts, built by Manchester in England in the mid-1950s, among the g 
most powerful steam locomotives in the world, used on the high traffic lines. 
Some diesels were introduced in the early 1950s, and in the early 
7 
1960s plans were made for complete dieselisation. But this was never completed, 
for reasons noted below. As of 1976, for example, on the Tanzania lines there 
were 50 line and 16 switching diesels, and 98 steam locomotives, of which 50 
5. In 1970, for example, K sh. 36 million; or abour 4.3 million U.S. 
dollars. 
6. The Beyer-Garrett is essentially two locomotives in one, designed 
to distribute the weight of the engine on the light-rail lines of the developing 
countries. 
7. As of 1957, there were 129 Beyer-Garretts, 22 standard steam locomotives, 
56 tank locomotives (used for switching) and 46 diesels. CDay 1964, p. 39) 
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were Beyer-Garretts. Some of the others were as much as 60 years old. As the 
steam locomotives become older, repair costs increase, and the advantages of 
dieselisation are being lost. East Africa has no coal; if it did, and the steam 
locomotives were coal burning, there would be some incidental benefit in re-
taining them. There are still, of course, plans to dieselise in both countries; 
Kenya plans complete dieselisation by 1980-81. 
Passenger equipment is relatively modern on the Nairobi line, but in 
Tanzania most of the coaches date back to the mid 1920s. 
The mainline Mombasa-Kampala track remains in good condition, the 
other Kenya lines in satisfactory condition but many needing heavier rail. The 
main Tanzania lines are in fair condition, but the Central line was built 
cheaply, and the management believes that complete rebuilding is essential. 
Some of the branch lines in Uganda are reported to be virtually inoperable. 
The gauge is one metre, and thus differs from the track in all of 
Southern and Central Africa, which is 1.067 metres. The problem will be dis-
cussed below. 
g 
The Deterioration 
In the late 1960s a major development plan for the railway was 
prepared, involving change in the tariff structure, new equipment and other 
features. But this was not to be implemented except for the tariff changes 
noted; the system began to deteriorate in 1973 and the process culminated in 
1975 in the breaking up of the system into two and to some extent three parts. 
The source of the difficulty was political, not to any extent economic or 
technical. Relations among the three member states of the East African Community 
became increasingly strained. Under military dictatorship Uganda became in-
creasingly disorganised economically for essentially political reasons, beginning 
with the expulsion of the Asians, and increasingly hostile to Kenya, culminating 
in claims to a portion of Kenyan territory early in 1976. At times Kenyan railroad 
employees were reportedly mistreated in Uganda; Kenya at times stopped rail (and 
road) service to Uganda; and, after Uganda had built up large debts, restricted 
exports to Uganda The issues became very complicated, in part a result of 
Uganda's volatile behaviour. But one net effect was a decline in both import and 
export rail traffic to Uganda and passenger travel. 
8. A detailed description of the disintegration of the East African 
Community is provided in Hazlewood, 1975. 
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The difficulties Between Kenya and Tanzania were caused less by 
personalities than by differences in political-economic philosophy and the long 
standing belief that Kenya benefited at Tanzania's expense as a result of the common 
market. Socialist Tanzania became more and more unhappy with essentially free-
enterprise Kenya and more and more determined to make its economy self-sufficient. 
There was now a belief in Tanzania that the Tanzania lines were subsidising the 
main Nairobi line, partly because Kenya was favouring road transport. 
There were several consequences of these political differences 
(which affected other issues as well and culminated in 1977 in the liquidation 
of East African Airways). 
1. The countries could not agree on the provision of funds to E.A.R. 
for major capital improvements, and foreign lenders were inclined to provide 
funds to the individual countries rather than the Community. 
2. Tanzania and Uganda failed to remit to headquarters in Nairobi 
funds collected from shippers in their countries. Partly this reflected the 
desperate foreign exchange positions in which both countries found themselves. 
3. Tanzania began to divert the Moshi-Arusha traffic to Tanga 
and Dar es Salaam rather than to Mombasa, the more logical outlet and the 
dominant one even as late as 1970 for this area. 
4. Following Tanzania's action in barring Kenya road transporters 
from hauling goods from Mombasa to Zambia (by setting uneconomically low 
weight limits), and in the belief that Tanzania was not returning freight cars, 
in 197 5 Kenya cut the Voi-Moshi line at the border by removing two sections of 
rail, and the rail connection between the two parts of the system ended. 
5. Disputes among the three countries resulted in the ending of 
all shipping service on Lake Victoria, thus bringing to an end the operation 
of the two car ferries and rail service to Musoma, which has rail lines for 
loading cars to go on the ships, but no overland rail connections. 
Thus by 1975 management control over the system came to an end. 
The Tanzania portion operated on its own, managed by regional personnel in Dar 
es Salaam, but cut off from the training school and the main repair shops. The 
portion is doing the best that it can in its own shops in Morogoro (steam) and 
Dar es Salaam (diesel). The main line is managed from the old headquarters in 
Nairobi, but the control over the Uganda portion is tenuous at best. There are 
other problems as well. There is a serious shortage of motive power and cars, 
the major elements of the system. The steam locomotives are becoming increasingly 
obsolete; the sight of a great Beyer-Garrett taking the Moshi passenger train 
out of the old Dar es Salaam station in March of 1976 was impressive - but not a 
mark of efficiency. However, several have been completely rebuilt. There is 
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a serious lack of parts, aggravated in-Tanzania by the acute shortage of foreign 
exchange, which makes it difficult for the railway to acquire needed items. 
Failure to modernise as planned, acute shortages, and obsolete equipment con-
stitute an increasingly serious problem. Morale of employees declined sharply 
as the system disintegrated. The decline should not be exaggerated; the trains 
do run, and substantial volumes of freight and passengers are carried. But 
the deterioration is serious. 
The system has suffered as well from increased road transport 
competition. Partly, as noted, this has resulted from inadequate capacity of 
the railroad, deterioration in service, and the value-of-service tariff. Road 
transport could easily take the high-rate merchandise traffic even though its 
costs were higher than overall rail costs. Kenya and Tanzania, and particularly 
the latter, had followed, in colonial and early post-colonial periods, a very 
strict road transport licensing policy to protect rail traffic. But a few 
years after independence this policy was abandoned. Kenya encouraged African 
entrepreneurship in the road transport field, stressed the building of trunk 
roads competitive with the railroad lines, and let weight limits go unenforced. 
The result was a shift of much of the high-rate traffic, including petroleum, 
from rail to road. Tanzania, with its stress on co-operatives, encouraged co-
operative trucking ventures. Uganda had never employed restrictive licensing 
of road transport. Furthermore, in both Kenya and Tanzania, the road licensing 
control was tending to break down with the development of more and more private 
carrier operations, with goods often handled illegally for other firms on the 
back haul. 
As noted, these shifts should not be exaggerated. A 1976 estimate 
of the Tanzania government is that 4-2 per cent of all traffic moved by rail, 
54 per cent by road and 3 per cent by water, although much of the country was 
not served by the railway. The volume of traffic on the Kenya line remains 
heavy, but now is substantially less than in 1970. 
The Immediate Solutions 
With the collapse of E.A.R. as an operating entity, the railroads 
have essentially, in fact, become direct agencies of the three governments, 
though little is known of what has actually happened in Uganda. Both Kenya 
and Tanzania have provided funds to cover operating deficits and limited funds 
for improvements. (Tanzania provided shs. 37 million in 1976.) This trend will 
undoubtedly continue. A World Bank sponsored study by a Canadian firm, completed 
in 1976, concluded that regionalisation of the system was essential, given political 
realities. Separation into three elements does not necessarily mean great loss 
m operating efficiency, especially if co-operation is resummed among them, and 
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the separation offers one great advantage. In the past, while roads and road 
transport were regarded as a national activity, ET.fl.R. was not, to the inevitable 
neglect by each government of rail transport and overstress on road transport. 
With both rail and road now instruments of the national governments, it should 
be much easier to attain an appropriate balance. 
Separation, of course, will not solve the problem of loss of traffic 
arising out of political difficulties - the ending of the ship service on Lake 
Victoria and the Tanzania-Kenya service, the collapse of the Uganda economy. 
It is unlikely that the Moshi traffic will ever flow through Mombasa again to 
any extent. But some intercountry traffic may be restored in time if the three 
countries again begin to co-operate. 
The Growth of Road Transport 
Road transport in East Africa began at an early date, certainly by 
the 1930s, but it developed slowly, partly because of very inadequate roads, 
partly because of general shortage of capital, partly because of a highly restric-
9 
tive road licensing policy in Kenya and Tanganyika. The relatively long 
distances likewise deterred growth. Only in Uganda, with its early development 
of good roads, no restrictive licensing and relatively short hauls, did road 
transport develop to any extent prior to independence (Hawkins, 1962). Since 
the early 1960s, there has been a very rapid increase in road transport through-
out East Africa, both in non-rail areas and in competition with the railroad, 
particularly in Kenya on the important Mombasa-Nairobi segment. General economic 
development, rapid construction of trunk roads, to which Kenya gave particular 
attention until 197 5 (surfacing of the Nairobi-Mombasa road was completed in 
1968), ending of the restrictive road licensing policy, failure to enforce weight 
limits in Kenya, deliberate governmental encouragement of co-operatives in 
Tanzania and of African entrepreneurship in Kenya, lack of adequate rail capacity 
and deteriorating rail service: all these contributed to the rapid growth of road 
transport. 
The structure of the road transport industry differs among the countries. 
The dominant firm in Kenya is KENATCO, owned by the government of Kenya, but with 
much of its hauling done by independent private contractors. There are a number 
of independent firms. In Tanzania there have been several attempts to develop 
co-operative trucking enterprises, and considerable trucking is carried on by 
the various co-operatives and parastatals. There are some private firms, but 
many of these, it is reported, have been squeezed out in recent years by rising 
costs and fixed rates. Uganda has had much more of a private enterprise regime 
in trucking. 
9. The volume by Hofmeier (1973) stresses road transport in Tanzania. 
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There has been little rail-road coordination. East African Rail-
ways developed an extensive road transport network (freight and bus) only in 
the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, particularly in the Mbeya-Iringa area not 
reached by a rail line, but there has been no piggy-back development (ed. note: 
the transport of loaded truck trailers by rail) and little use of containers. 
It is argued that given the availability of cheap labour, there is little gain 
in containerisation; in addition, there is a serious directional unbalance of 
traffic. But the trend to containerisation in ocean freight is strong, and 
there is obvious potential gain for the railway from increased container use. 
The road transport sector was the setting for one of the most 
bitter disputes in the East African Community. In 1974, because of the conges-
tion in the harbour in Dar es Salaam, Kenya and Zambia arranged for road trans-
port of substantial Zambia traffic from Mombasa. In 1975 Tanzania brought this 
traffic to a halt by limiting road transport vehicles to 19.4 tons, without a 
trailer, making the traffic uneconomic. There were several motives. The an-
nounced reason, which was probably at least a partial one, was the dam.igc being 
done by these trucks to the Tanzania roads. But a more signifii-uut ue was the 
desire by Tanzania to ensure that the traffic to Zambia passed through Dar es 
Salaam or Tanga. In addition, there was a good bit of criticism of Kenya capital-
ism; while KENATCO had the contract, much of the trucking was done by private 
firms as subcontractors. One consequence was Kenya's action in severing the 
rail link west of Voi. 
Relative Rail and Truck Costs 
Good general data on relative costs of rail and road transport are 
difficult to obtain. The most exhaustive study was that undertaken by the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit for the East African Community under World Bank sponsor-
ship in 1969. The basic rail cost figure is well know - in the early 1970s 
about 20 Kenya cents per ton mile. Revenues are as low as 11 cents on median 
hauls and 8 cents on long ones. This suggests that the direct costs are at 
least this low, under the assumption (not necessarily correct) that the rail-
iy has not set rates below out-of-pocket cost. An estimate by Hazlewood for 
- transport in Kenya was 40 Kenya cents per ton mile (1964, p. 66); O'Connor 
estimates for Uganda 50 Uganda cents if there is traffic only one way, 30 cents 
if there is traffic both ways (1965, p. 128). Some estimates, however, in-
dicated costs for road transport as low as 8 cents - a figure not generally be-
lieved to be accurate. While these figures are somewhat obsolete in an absolute 
sonse, the relationships between road and rail have probably not changed much. 
Other studies suggest similar figures. East African Railway0 road 
services in Tanzania charge from 30 to 35 Tanzanian cents a ton mile for larger 
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shipments. Costs of moving rice from Mbeya to Dar es Salaam were shown by 
Hofmeier to be 25 cents a ton mile (.1973, pp. 193 , 196), of shipments from 
Dar to Arusha, 28 cents, whereas rail charges were as low as 7.6 cents on 
long haul bulk movements. Other figures for Tanzania show road costs as low 
as 15 cents per ton mile with a full load in both directions, 28 cents with 
an empty return. 
The net conclusions of these and other studies are that average 
rail costs are lower than truck costs, but the differences are not tremendous. 
The great difference is between road transport costs and long distance bulk 
rail commodity rates, some of which, of course, may be below marginal cost. 
The very rapid growth in road transport in East Africa therefore cannot be 
explained in terms of lower rates; the other major factors have been inadequate 
rail capacity to handle the traffic (this was particularly important in shift-
ing petroleum from rail to road between Mombasa and Nairobi), deteriorating rail 
service with delivery time of from two to three weeks, the greater flexibility 
of trucking, the emphasis of the Kenya government upon the need for African entre-
preneurship in the road transport industry, and the advantages of private carrier 
operation to many business firms. 
The Kenya line is faced with drastic loss in traffic - as much 
as 20 per cent - with the completion of the oil pipe line from Mombasa to 
Nairobi by the end of 1977. Originally all of this traffic moved by rail; in 
recent years a substantial amount shifted to road, partly because of shortage 
of rail tank cars, the available supply being reserved for the longer haul to 
Uganda. The pipe line will bring an end to all rail, as well as truck, move-
ment of petroleum with a cost reduction estimated between 64 and 74 per cent 
of present rail and road costs. The line will carry initially 1.44 million tons 
of petroleum a year, ultimately 5.12 million tons. There has been some con-
troversy in Kenya over this project, but the general attitude of the government 
has been that the pipeline will free rail capacity for other purposes and the 
cost reduction will more than offset any loss to the railway. But the immediate 
effect is certain to be adverse to E.A.R. 
Some Policy Issues 
Some major issues relating to transport remain to be resolved in 
East Africa, and the future is by no means clear, partly because it depends to 
such a great extent on political relationships among the three countries. 
1. Future rail vs. road relationships. This issue is common to 
all African countries and will be analysed in the overall summary section. The 
particular problem of the past in East Africa was that there was no co-ordination 
of road investment and road hauling control policy, whereas the railroads were 
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unified. If there are to be three separate railroads in the future, this prob-
lem will be avoided, but overall coordination of transport in East Africa will 
be much more difficult. 
2. Possible extension of rail lines. In the last decade, Tanzania 
has been much more enthusiastic about construction of new rail lines than Kenya 
(most of the new mileage since 1960, other than the TAZARA, has actually been 
in Uganda). But currently the one project that is under serious consideration 
(bids have been requested) is for a line in the Kerio Valley in Kenya, extending 
from Kampi ya Moto to Tenges (10 miles), Kimwarer and Koloa, a total of 62 miles, 
designed to serve fluorspar and other mineral deposits. A cut-off from the main 
Kenya line to the Arusha line to shorten the distance to Nairobi has long been 
considered but is unlikely to be built, given present conditions. A much more 
serious project is one from the Moshi line to Musoma on Lake Victoria to enable 
the traffic from Musoma to move directly by rail through Tanzania and give Uganda 
a route to the sea independent of Kenya (no great advantage at the moment, since 
relations between Uganda and Tanzania have been worse than those between Uganda 
and Kenya ). 
3. Improvement of the rail lines. While the main Kenya line 
remains in relatively good physical condition, the branches are in need of heavier 
rail, and the entire Tanzania Central line requires substantial rebuilding, it 
is reported by the Tanzanian authorities. 
i+. The problem of the light traffic branch lines. There are a 
number of lines with relatively light traffic - under 300,000 net ton miles per 
mile per year. The Mpanda branch in Tanzania ia the worst, with less than 50,000 
net ton miles per mile. Built to serve lead mines that have ceased operating, 
it has been kept in service by direct subsidy of the Tanzania government because 
of limited road facilities in the area. Both the long Kasese and Pakwach branches 
in Uganda have traffic under 300,000 net ton miles. Studies elsewhere indicate 
that such services are particularly likely to be sources of deficits - yet they 
may be important for regional development purposes. 
5. Gauge. As discussed in the following section E.A.R. and TAZARA 
gauges are different and no interchange of traffic is possible. 
The Effects of the Railways upon Economic Development in East Africa 
Two studies in the last decade have considered the question of the 
effects that the building of railway lines have had in East Africa, that by 
-0, There has also been discussion of a line to connect Kenya with the 
Sudan railways. 
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A.M. O'Connor on Uganda (1965), and of Rolf Hofmeier on Tanzania 0-973). The 
studies suggest that the building of the Kenya-Uganda line from Mombasa to Kisumu 
(with the steamer connection to Uganda), the Tanga-Moshi and the Tanzania Central 
lines all significantly aided economic development by allowing the development 
of export-oriented agriculture and other activities and importation of manufac-
tured goods. In doing so they perpetuated the export-of-materials, import-of-
manufactured-goods approach to development, from which a break has been made only 
in recent years. The whole pattern of economic activity of Tanzania centred 
around the two rail lines, while the Southern Highlands, with many economic 
advantages, lagged badly. The Kenya-Uganda railway was almost solely responsible 
for the existence and dominance of Nairobi. 
But there is strong evidence that later rail building has had 
much less economic effect, even the rail line from Kisumu to Kampala. Economic 
activity in Uganda never has clustered around the railway as in many other 
African countries. The Kasese line in Uganda, while allowing the development 
of copper mining, contributed little to overall economic development of western 
Uganda, given the availability of road transport. The Mpanda line in Tanzania 
did little to create activity, and the Manyoni-Kinyangari line built in the 1930s 
in central Tanzania into the Singidi region had so little effect that it was 
abandoned in 1947. The extreme case was the line from Mtwara to Nachingwea and 
Masasi in southern Tanzania. Built as an element in the groundnut scheme, it 
had so little effect on development that it was abandoned in 1962, eight years 
after building (four years in the case of Masasi branch), following the end of 
the scheme. Abandonment may have been premature, but certainly there was no 
evidence of stimulus to economic activity. 
ZAMBIA AND OUTLETS TO THE SEA 
The development of few, if any, African countries has been influenced 
as much by the railroad as Zambia. Virtually all commercial activity has developed 
in the narrow belt up through the centre of "the country known as 'line of rail'. 
Furthermore, no other country has had its pattern of rail traffic so disrupted in re 
cent years as Zambia, and it has shared with Tanzania the most important rail 
construction project in the developing world in the last several decades. 
Development of Railways to Zambia11 
Unlike other tropical African railways, the line reaching Zambia 
was not built directly in from the nearest port, but came north out of southern 
11. A survey of the development of the rail lines to Zambia is provided 
by Bostock,1971, pp. 377-96. 
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Africa. In the early 1890s, the South African railway system reached Mafeking 
(famous for the great siege in the Boer War), and the Rhodes interests (British 
South Africa Co.) pushed a line across the deserts of Bechuanaland (now Botswana) 
to reach Bulawayo in 1897. Already there were European settlers in Southern 
Rhodesia. The line, later called Rhodesia Railways (R.R. ),was designed in part to 
provide access to the settlers and the farm land, but Rhodes was also lured by 
the known but as yet undeveloped mineral resources in what are now Zambia and 
Zaire, and by his dream of a Cape to Cairo railway. The line reached the coal 
mines of Wankie in 1903, crossed the Zambesi into Northern Rhodesia at one of 
the few feasible spots just below Victoria Falls in 1903, and reached the lead-
zinc mining area of Broken Hill (.now Kabwe) in 1906. A siding about half way up 
through Northern Rhodesia was labeled Lusaka; three decades later (1935) the site 
was designated to become the capital of the colony. A line also was extended 
north from Bulawayo to Salisbury (1902), and in 1899 another B, S,A. 'railroad "had 
reached Salisbury from the port of Beira in Mozambique. In 1909 in an effort 
to obtain an outlet for the copper mines they were developing in Katanga in the 
southern Congo, British interests headed by Sir Robert Williams built south from 
the Congo to join Rhodesia Railways at Broken Hill. This line, as far as the 
Congo border, was taken over by R.R.in 1928. Rhodesia Railways was an element 
in the great British South Africa Company complex in central Africa; the company 
ruled Northern Rhodesia politically as well as economically until 1924, when the 
area became a crown colony. 
Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., the Williams enterprise, also built 
the Benguela Railway, extending from the port of Lobito in Angola, reaching the 
Congo border in 1931 and connecting with the Congo lines, thus providing the 
Katanga mines and those of Zambia with another outlet to the sea. Likewise in 
1928, Belgian interests completed a line from the Katanga area to Port Francqui 
(now Ilebo) on rhe Kasai River, from which water transport was available. In 
1947 Rhodesia Railways was nationalised; under the statutory authority of the 
countries involved, following the formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1954, the system was transferred to the Federation. The centre of 
operations and the main shops were in Bulawayo. Another route to the sea 
from the Bulawayo-Salisbu^y line to Louren^o Marques in Mozambique - providing 
a less congested route for Zambia traffic than the Beira line - was completed in 
1955. 
Thus at the time of Zambian independence in 1964, virtually all 
Zambian import traffic (including petroleum) and export traffic was handled by 
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Rhodesia Railways; " few countries in the world were so completely dependent on 
rail transport for their access to the outside world. Most Zambia traffic moved 
via Beira and Louren^o Marques; there was likewise substantial through rail 
traffic between Zambia and South Africa, traditionally the supplier of processed 
foods and many other commodities for the country. There was only a limited 
13 amount of road transport, primarily with Rhodesia. Initially after independence 
Rhodesia Railways was owned and controlled jointly by Zambia and Southern 
Rhodesia, still a crown,colony. The Lobito route via the Benguela handled little 
14 
Zambia traffic. Zaire copper moved partly via the Benguela, partly via the 
Port Francqui route, under pressure from the Zaire government. Most of the 
Benguela's traffic came from within Angola. 
Disruption of Traffic Patterns 
The twelve-year period from 1965 through 1976, and particularly 
1973 to 1976 saw several major disruptions in access routes to the sea and in 
traffic patterns within the country. These disruptions resulted entirely from 
political events, which can be noted briefly: 
1. In 1965 Rhodesia declared itself independent from Great 
Britain. U.D.I. - Unilateral Declaration of Independence, as it was called -
under a white regime was viewed with great disfavour in Zambia. Zambia forced 
the dissolution of Rhodesia Railways as a joint venture as of 1 July 1967 
and took over operation of the portion north of the Victoria Falls bridge, but 
retained few of the employees (the great majority were white and most preferred 
15 
to stay in Rhodesia) and only an inadequate share of rolling stock and engines. 
For a time all engines had to be sent to Bulawayo for repair, until Zambia 
completed its own repair shops at Kabwe (formerly Broken Hill). Even the billing 
was done from Bulawayo for a time. Zambia was committed to use R.R. for all 
international rail traffic or pay a penalty on any traffic diverted under the 
terms of the breakup. 
12. Even the headquarters of Zambia Customs and Excise was (and still is) 
located in Livingstone. 
13. The rail distance from Lusaka to Salisbury was almost three times the 
road distance. A direct rail link, crossing the Zambesi at Chirundu, was long 
planned. 
14. This was a product of agreements between the railways and the copper 
companies» In 1936 the copper companies agreed to ship entirely via R.R. in ex-
change for low rates. In 1957 under pressure of the companies, R.R. agreed to 
let a specified amount of copper move out via Lobito, but then quoted such a low 
rate on this segment that it also moved via Rhodesia. 
15. The first year of Zambia Railways operation was one of chaos, derail-
ments, and an inability to keep coal moving to the mining complex. (Toronto 
Globe and Mail, 11 October " 1968, p. 2) 
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Secondly, the government began to divert a substantial amount 
of traffic via truck transport to Dar es Salaam, under great difficulties 
because of the bad condition of the Great North Road, and via the Benguela. 
After Rhodesia cut off petroleum supplies, the country was drastically short of 
petroleum products which had to be trucked from Dar es Salaam until a pipe line 
was completed from Dar es Salaam to Ndola in 1968. Despite these changes, 
however, a substantial portion of the copper exports and necessary imports 
still came via Rhodesia Railways (.Table 2). There were endless feuds with 
Rhodesia over car supply - in general Rhodesia would permit only the same number 
of cars to go into Zambia as returned from Zambia. 
2. In 1973, Zambia closed the border completely with Rhodesia, 
following a temporary closure by Rhodesia, as a result of political disputes. 
This resulted in immediate and drastic changes in traffic patterns, as two-
thirds of the imports and over half the exports were still moving via Rhodesia. 
Most of the exports and a large portion of the imports formerly going via 
Rhodesia were shifted to the Benguela route, causing serious congestion at the 
port of Lobito. This pattern continued through the first half of 1975. Road 
transport to Dar es Salaam, Malawi and Mombasa in Kenya rose sharply in 1973. 
3. In 1975, the Benguela route was disrupted and finally closed in 
August by hostilities in Angola. 
At the same time, in October of 1975, the new TAZARA rail was 
opened for limited service, as explained in detail below. But initially TAZARA 
had only limited carrying capacity, and Zambia was forced to substantially 
increase reliance on the Dar es Salaam and Malawi truck routes - in a period 
when equipment had been declining in anticipation of the opening of TAZARA. To 
complicate matters still further, late in 1974 Tanzania effectively halted road 
transport from Mombasa - the most efficient port in the entire region. 
The rerouting following the border closing in 1973 had increased 
transport costs by an estimated Kwacha 20 million (about U.S. $30 million) in 
that year and Kwacha 30 million in 1975 - adding to inflationary pressures 
m Zambia. 
Zambia Railways 
The internal rail system of the country is now entirely operated 
by Zambia Railways (Z.R.), wholly owned by the government but operated as a 
16. In the period 1973 to May 1976, K 1.00=U.S. $1.55; after devaluation 
that month Kl.00=11.S. $1.25. For some vears Drior to 1973, K1.00=U.S. $1.40. 
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separate government corporation in the same fashion as Zambia Airways. Its 
own line is 650 miles in length, and it also operates about 75 miles of the former 
Zambesi Sawmills Railway as an agent for the government. The -main Z.R. line 
extends in a general north-south direction from the connection on the Victoria 
Falls bridge with Rhodesia Railways via Lusaka to the Copper Belt, specifically 
via Ndola and Kitwe and Chililabomwe to Konkola on the Zaire border, with branches 
in the Copper Belt to Mufilira, to Luanshya and from Ndola to Sakamia to connect 
with the Zaire lines. There are no other branches except a short one serving 
the Maamba coal mines. The former Zambezi Sawmills Railway, built to serve the 
timber industry in the Southern province, extends northwestward from Livingstone 
to Mulobezi. The line once extended another 50 miles to Kataba for the handling 
of logs, but this portion is not now operated (though shown on most maps). 
Z.R. was built to the 1.067 metre gauge - known as Cape Gauge -
used by all main lines from Zambia and Zaire south. Track is in good condition; 
the sawmills line, which had deteriorated, has been rebuilt in the last two 
years. Z.R. is entirely dieselised, with 80 diesels; 10 were received in 1975 
and 8 more are on ord er. These are U.S. General Electric built engines, with 
which the system is well satisfied. A number of the Beyer-Garretts inherited 
from Rhodesia Railways are still in the yards in Livingstone awaiting ultimate 
scrapping. A number of new freight cars (wagons) have been acquired, typically 
with 40-ton capacity, and another 1,000 are on order. Cars are freely interchanged 
in normal times - with the Benguela and Zaire, Rhodesian, South African and 
Mozambique lines. 
Gross revenue of the railway in 1975 was Kwacha 27.9 million; in 
1976 an estimated Kwacha 35 million. Despite the complete disruption of traffic 
patterns in recent years (when copper moves out via the Benguela Z.R. receives 
little revenue, and not much more with TAZARA), the great increase in road trans-
port on the import-export routes, the petroleum pipe line and the shift to petro-
leum from coal by the mining complex for many purposes, the railway has avoided 
large deficits (the figure in 1975 was only .Kwacha 600,000) and hopes to be 
covering all costs in the immediate future. 
Since independence the railway has been assisted in many ways by 
Canadian National Railways (C.N.R.). A formal management contract expired in 
November 1975, with management entirely Zambianised, but C.N.R. still provides 
technical assistance. Almost the entire staff has been newly recruited since 
1967. Headquarters and main shops are in Kabwe. 
The traffic patterns, as noted, have shifted dramatically. 
Prior to 1967 virtually all imports came in via Livingstone and were taken north 
almost the entire distance of the line to the Copper Belt or over half of the 
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entire line to Lusaka. This traffic included very heavy volumes of petroleum 
products coming from Beira, coal from the Wankie mines in Rhodesia, and products 
from South Africa, including fertiliser, coke, farm and mining equipment, processed 
foods, etc. The copper and other exports (copper constitutes about 95 per cent 
of the total) came down the entire distance from the Copper Belt to the Victoria 
bridge. Currently nothing for Zambia comes in at Victoria Falls, although in 
the last two years the road has handled substantial transit traffic between 
Zaire and Rhodesia (copper going out, particularly after the closing of the 
Benguela, coal and maize coming in). By agreement with Zaire, Zambia handles 
this traffic, although it will not handle any Zambia traffic from Rhodesia. 
The principal Z.R. traffic items in recent years have been copper, 
hauled the relatively short distance to the Zaire border and now to the junction 
with TAZARA at Kapiri Mposhi; some lead and zinc from Kabwe to Kapiri; sub-
stantial movements of maize, mostly from southern Zambia to the Copper Belt and 
for export to Zaire and Tanzania; and coal, from the Maamba mines to the Copper 
Belt. The government has been moving all petroleum products within the country 
by road, but some of this is likely to be returned to rail. In 197 5, 59 per cent 
of Z.R. traffic was domestic, the rest export traffic. 
Traffic volume was 1,323 million ton miles in 1973, 1,105 million 
in 1974-, and about 1,300 million in 1975, or 2.2 million ton miles per mile of 
line. The revenue is about 2.6 ngwee per ton kilometre, compared to an estimated 
average of 5 to 6 ngwee for heavy volume trucking. The 2.6 figure is roughly 
equal to 4.6 U.S. cents per ton mile at current exchange rates. The traffic volume 
is not as heavy as on the main Mombasa-Nairobi line of E.A.R., nor as the expected 
volume on TAZARA when it is in full-scale operation; it is somewhat comparable 
to that of the Tanzania Central line and adequate to allow reasonably low cost. 
The tariff is basically a class tariff comparable to that of 
East African Railways in many respects with 14 classes, classification based on 
cost, value of service, and essentiality considerations, plus separate rates for 
tank cars and mineral products Cthe lowest figures) and special rates on copper. 
There has been less concern thus far about the loss of high-rate commodities to 
road transport than in some countries because transport is so completely controlled 
by the government, given the scarcity of facilities. 
For many years, daily passenger service was operated Lusaka to 
Livingstone, and overnight three times a week Lusaka to the Copper Belt. The 
initial equipment after independence consisted of ancient wooden open vestibule 
cars of Rhodesia Railways. These were replaced by diesel motor trains, and in 
--•5 by new equipment manufactured in Japan. Since that time two trains are 
operated each day, the relatively fast Kafue and the slower Luangwa, The former 
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provides three classes, sleeper, standard and economy, the latter standard 
and economy. In 1976, the sleeper fare Livingstone to Lusaka was Kwacha 
16.60, standard Kwacha 8.30, economy Kwacha 5.50. These are roughly fares of 
6, 4 and 2 U.S. cents a mile. About 1,200,000 passengers are carried per year. 
Internal Road Transport 
Road transport in Zambia is dominated by Contract Haulage, 
formerly Central African Road Services, a parastatal organisation. Contract 
Haulage maintains a fleet of its own trucks and also contracts with private 
trucking firms. It also handles the Malawi export-import road service as a 
part of the Dar es Salaam traffic as a subcontractor. Rates ranged in 1974 
from 1.2 to 4.6 ngwee (ed. note: 100 ngwee - 1 Zambian Kwacha] per ton kilo-
metre. Both Contract Haulage and private firms contract with NAMB0RD, which 
controls all farm product marketing, for transport of farm products on a 
set rate schedule which in 1974 was as follows: fertiliser and maize: ng per t/KM 
7.50 up to 80 km, 6.75 for 81 to 160 km and 6.00 over 160 km; cotton, ng per 
t/m 9. NAMBORD's policy is to use rail wherever feasible, partly because it 
is cheaper, partly because of general government policy. 
In the days before independence, the Federation restricted road 
competition with the rail system drastically. While present policy is less 
restrictive, there is no free competition and so much of the total traffic is by 
or for parastatal organisations that the overall picture differs markedly from 
that of Kenya. 
The Export Routes 
The major export routes noted above can be described briefly. 
Rhodesia Railways to Beira and Lourengo.. Marques (MaputoI. As noted, this 
route carried virtually all import and export traffic prior to 1967. The line 
was well built and the equipment modern. The revenues rose steadily up until 
1966, but the operating ratio was relatively high, averaging 84 in this period 
(Prest 1969, p. 95). Rate policies were influenced by the desire to hold the 
copper traffic from the Benguela, but the usual pattern was to keep copper rates 
relatively high except for the marginal traffic that could, by agreement, go via 
the Benguela. This amounted to a form of profits tax on the copper companies 
benefiting the Federation and reducing the amount that Northern Rhodesia and 
then Zambia could raise by an income tax on the companies' profits. Particularly 
high rates were charged at times on Zaire copper, but the Zaire firms could not 
effectively avoid this because they had to rely on Rhodesia Railway for their 
coal from Wankie. 
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After years of profit, except in the 1962-63 period, the loss 
of traffic and rising costs resulted in small deficits in the early 1970s; 
in 1971+ the first "full year after closure of the border, the system incurred 
a net loss of Kwacha 10 million (about U.S. $15.5 million 1, and in 197 5 
Kwacha 21 million(U.S.$31 million). Guerilla warfare has resulted in some 
damage to the lines. 
From a longer range standpoint, African rule of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 
will undoubtedly result in some resumption of traffic from Zambia via Victoria 
Falls and the Mozambique ports and trade between Zambia and Zimbabwe, although 
the Salisbury-Lusaka-Copper Belt traffic except in bulk commodities is almost 
certain to go by road. Opening of the border at Victoria Falls would also result, 
in all likelihood, in the resumption of rail traffic in fertiliser from South 
Africa, and in beef and other products from Botswana. But never again is this 
likely to be a major route for exports and imports for Zambia. 
The Benguela Railroad, via Zaire and the port of Lobito. This route involves, 
in traffic from the Copper Belt, a relatively short haul on Zambia Railways, 
thence via the Zaire system (S.N.C.Z.) through Lubumbashi to Tenke on the main 
line to Port Francqui, westward to Dilolo, and thence westward on the Benguela 
to the port of Lobito. The Benguela has been a subsidiary of Tanganyika 
Concessions Ltd., a British firm, and unique in its reliance on wood burning 
steam locomotives. The line was to revert to Portugal in the 1980s•, its present 
status is not clear, but undoubtedly it has been or will be nationalised. This 
route offers one very significant advantage: since Lobito is on the Atlantic, 
the total haul is substantially less than via Indian Ocean ports, and substantial 
time - as much as two weeks - is saved. This is particularly important for imports. 
But use of the route was long restricted by the agreements between the mining 
companies and Rhodesia Railways,by Rhodesia Railways' rate policies, by the fact 
that the port of Lobito was less satisfactory for handling cargo than Beira, by 
limitations on capacity on outbound traffic because of the handling of large 
quantities of Angolan manganese and iron ore, and during the period between 
Zambian and Angolan independence by the reluctance of the Zambian government, 
for political reasons, to make use of this route. 
Once Zambia closed the Rhodesia route completely, it was forced 
as a practical matter to make greater use of the Benguela, in part because Lobito 
alone could handle some types of heavy cargo. Furthermore, by then Angolan 
independence was assured. In 1972 this route handled only 14 per cent of Zambia's 
imports and exports; in 1974, about 50 per cent. In that year, for example, the 
port handled some 104,000 tons of wheat for Zambia, 51,000 tons of coke, 259,000 
tons of general import cargo. But this sudden shifting of traffic onto the Benguela 
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coincided with substantial unrest in Angola as independence approached, as well 
as loss of Portuguese technicians, which led to congestion in the port, sur-
charges by the shipping firms and delays in handling cargo. Then came the final 
breakdown in late 197 5 as military action resulted in severe damage to the line 
and destruction of two major bridges at Lumeje, west of Luso, and at Luau, close 
to the Zaire-Angola border. Continued unstable conditions resulted in delays 
in rebuilding the line and bridges. About 800 Zambia Railway freight cars were 
stranded in Angola, along with new diesels for the railway and substantial 
quantities of copper. 
Up until recent disorders, the Benguela has been a consistently 
profitable venture, with an average operating ratio of 60 for 1955-60 (Prest 
1969, p. 96) and consistent dividend payments. Partly, of course this was 
due to the absence of road transport competition; there are no roads of any 
kind between Zambia and Katanga (now Shaba 1 and the Atlantic. Secondly, it 
handles a substantial volume of traffic, although much of it is of low value 
and earns low rates. 
Over time, the Benguela should again become a significant out-
let to the sea for Zambia, particularly for import traffic, given the importance 
of speed. While Zambia is committed in principle to concentrate traffic on 
the Dar es Salaam route, there is substantial feeling that the country should 
never allow itself to be dependent solely on one route. Possible completion of 
an all-Zaire route would hurt the Benguela to some extent, but renewed development 
in Angola should in time more than offset this. 
The capacity of the Benguela was greatly increased by the completion 
in 1974 of the Cubal variant, 128 kilometres of relocated line beginning about 350 
kilometres east of Lobito, built to eliminate severe grades that reduced train 
speed and length drastically. 
The lines in Zaire were built by several private firms, allied 
with the mining complex in Katanga and to some extent with the Benguela. The 
most important was B.C.K. (Bas-Congo au Katanga), later K.D.L. (Kinshasa-
Dilolo-Lubumbashi), the main route from the Zambia border to Port Francqui (now 
17 
Ilebo). A second major route extends northeastward from Kamina, on the Ilebo 
line, to Kindu as part Of a rail-water-rail route to Kisangani and the original 
all-Congo route to the ocean. From Kabalo a branch (built in 1915) extends east-
17. The portions from Lubumbashi to Kamina and the junction at Tenke 
to Mutshatsha are electrified, the only electifield system in all tropical 
Africa. 
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18 ward to Kalemi (Albertville) on Lake Tanganyika. This system was not connected 
with B.C.K. between Kabalo and Kamina until 1957. These lines have been nationa-
lised in recent years, consolidated as the Soci£te Nationale de Chemins de Fer 
Zairois CS.N.C.Z.). The all-Congo route to the sea requires transfer to steamer 
at Ilebo on the Kasai River, transfer back to rail at Kinshasa and to ocean-going 
vessels at Matadi, Zaire's only ocean port. There have been extensive discussions 
about building a connecting link from Kinshasa to Ilebo through difficult terrain. 
Completion of this link would result in substantial diversion of Zaire traffic 
from the Benguela, but thus far Zaire has been unable to obtain financing for this 
project. 
Apart from the export traffic to Lobito, there is a considerable 
volume of traffic between Zambia and Zaire, consisting largely of maize exported 
to Zaire. Some 41,000 tons were reported in 1975. As of 1977 , some Zaire copper 
traffic is moving to the ocean via Zambia and TAZARA, as noted below. From 
a longer range standpoint, there is subFtantial rai1 traffic potentinl between 
the two countries, especially since the road system of Zaire is very limited. 
The Kenya Route. The port of Mombasa is one of the most modern in the world 
and one of the few good natural harbours in all Africa. It has not been congested 
in recent years, in part because of the diversion of the Arusha-Moshi traffic 
to Tanzanian ports. In 1973 KENATCO, the Kenya government-owned road transport 
firm, began hauling copper from Zambia and primarily sulphur and lubricants to 
Zambia, to the extent to which it was handling about 9 per cent of all Zambia 
traffic. Much of the hauling was done by private Kenya firms under contract to 
KENATCO. As noted, in late 1974 Tanzania put an abrupt end to this traffic by 
setting a 19.4 ton maximum load and banning trailers, thus making road haulage 
uneconomic. 
The Malawi Route. The original rail line to Malawi (then Nyasaland) was built 
north from Beira via Blantyre to Salima, on Lake Nyasa. In 1970 a line was 
completed east and west from Nova freixo on the rail line from the port of 
Nacala and Mozambique (city) to Vila Cabral in Mozambique east of Lake Nyasa, 
and to connect with the Malawi line north of Blantyre at Nayuci. The Malawi 
route with road transport to Salima was used for Zambia traffic to some extent 
from 1967 on. After the closure of the border with Rhodesia and the serious port 
congestion at Dar es Salaam, greater use of this route was undertaken, primarily 
for the handling of fertiliser which comes from South Africa, since Tanzania 
1 8 • This line was operated by the Compagnie de Chemins de Fer du 
Congo Superior aux Grands Lacs Africains. 
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will not handle any traffic originating in South Africa. By 1975, 75 per cent 
of all fertiliser was coming by this route, as well as considerable general 
cargo and about 10 per cent of the export of copper. Several problems arose 
very quickly: Malawi Railways' lack of freight cars and congestion in the 
ports of Nacala and Beira due in part to loss of Portuguese technicians after 
independence. The hauling to the railhead has been done by Contract Haulers, 
owned by the Zambia government, but it has been possible to handle only 12.5-
ton loads, given the condition of the roads. Extension of Malawi Railways to 
Lilongwe has shortened the road haul somewhat. There has also been some road 
hauling from Zambia to Moatize near Tete, the rail head in Mozambique, but the 
road conditions are particularly unsatisfactory. 
From a longer range standpoint, this route, with improved roads 
and/or a rail connection as noted below, may have some potential, but for the 
13 Copper Belt traffic it can scarcely be competitive with TAZARA. 
Kazengula Route. With the Rhodesian border closed, Zambia was cut off from 
direct contact with both Botswana and South Africa except by the Zambezi River 
crossing at Kazangula. The state of roads in Botswana prevented this route from 
being a significant avenue of commerce, but it has been used for hauling some 
mining equipment and supplies from South Africa, which, together with fertiliser, 
have been the only items Zambia has been purchasing from that country. This traf-
fic in general has moved through Zambia by road to the Copper Belt destinations. 
The Lake Tanganyika Routes. A route which traditionally was used for some 
traffic to Zambia involved rail movement on E.A.R.'s Tanzania Central line to 
Kigoma, transfer to steamer for the trip down Lake Tanganyika and road trans-
port from Mpulungu at the south end of the lake. In the late 1960s for example, 
considerable copper moved out this way, and petroleum for northern Zambia came 
by this route. But it was a slow route at best, requiring twice the time of the 
road haul to Dar es Salaam and two transfers. Use came to an end when the engines 
of the 60-year-old E.A.R. steamer, Liemba - the only vessel in the service - gave 
out in the early 1970s. An alternative route, involving rail movement through 
Zaire to Kalemie, transfer across the lake and E.A.R. from Kigoma, has not proved 
viable. 
Air Freight. For a time following the initial attempt to restrict traffic via 
Rhodesia and the petroleum shortage, air transport between the Copper Belt and 
13. Malawi Railways, with relatively short hauls, has not been highly 
profitable; the operating ratio for 1960-65 averaged 80, with an upward trend. 
(Prest,1969, p. 95) 
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Dar es Salaam was used to haul copper out and supplies in. But this proved to 
be very costly, and improvements in the Great North Road allowed the cessation 
of this traffic. Air freight, however, continues to be important for importation 
of some goods from Europe and Kenya, as well as meat from Botswana. It amounted 
to only 2.8 per cent of total Zambia imports in 1975 and yet used up 17 per cent 
of the country's payments for external freight traffic. 
The Dar es Salaam Route - Road Transport. At the time of independence in Zambia, 
the Great North Road to Dar es Salaam was a bare trek through the semi-desert, 
impossible in bad weather . Following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Rhodesia, the government of Zambia began an organised effort to haul copper 
out and imported goods in over this road. The result was a sharp increase in 
cost and very substantial damage to imported goods, but a substantial volume 
of goods flowed both ways. Gradually, with U.S. aid, the road was surfaced 
and the flow became much more regular, but it never handled more than half of 
the total traffic. In 1974, 70,000 tons of steel, 40,000 tons of chemicals 
and fertiliser, 16,300 tons of timber and 145,000 tons of general merchandise 
were hauled in. In that year there were 11,625 trips out and 12,613 in, or about 
30 a day each way. Some 245,000 tons of copper were carried out, as well as 
73,000 tons of maize to Tanzania. Zambia-Tanzania Road Services (Z.T.R.S.), owned 
by the two governments and an Italian firm, had the basic contract and carried 
about half the traffic in its own trucks, Contract Haulage (C.H.), owned by the 
government of Zambia, carried a portion and private subcontractors carried the 
remainder. Z.T.R.S. used trucks in the 25- to 30-ton range, averaging 23.1, 
Contract Haulage, 21.5 (net cargo). Z.T.R.S. was using 442 trucks; C.H., 105; 
and the other subcontractors, 419. The vehicles averaged from 1.3 to 1.7 
round trips per month. As of 1974, the rate on copper was Kwacha 54 per ton, 
on general cargo, Kwacha H9. The latter rate was 2.45 ngwee per ton kilometre, 
the equivalent of about 6.7 cents per U.S. ton-mile at 1975 exchange rates or 
5.3 cents at the more realistic 1977 exchange rate. All in all, this was a very 
impressive performance, particularly considering the fact that it was started 
from almost nothing and that phasing out, or at least a substantial reduction, 
was the long-range plan. 
TAZARA - The Dar es Salaam Rail Route. The idea of a railroad from the Copper 
Belt directly to the Indian Ocean had been considered long before Zambian in-
dependence. The first serious study was made by a consultant for the British 
Colonial Office, p u b l i s h e d in 1952 (United Kingdom,1952). After independence, 
studies were made by the World Bank (19641 and the Economic Commission for 
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Africa, which found such a railroad to be uneconomic. But the government of 
Zambia was extremely anxious to end reliance on the Rhodesian outlet and Tanzania 
was highly sympathetic to a rail line across the southern part of the country. 
The presidents of the two countries agreed on the desirability of the line in 
1964-. While the World Bank, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union all rejected 
requests to assist, a Canadian study (1966). indicated the economic feasibility 
of the line, even if the other routes could be used. In 1967 Zambia and 
Tanzania reached an agreement with China to build the line.15 The original plan 
to build to a connection to E.A.R. was abandoned because of the gauge difference, 
and the final plans called for a line all the way to the Dar harbour. Con-
struction began in 1970, the Zambia border was reached in 1973, and a connection 
with Zambia Railways at Kapiri Mposhi was completed in October of 1975. The 
16 railroad is known as TAZARA. 
The route passed through Mbeya (but not Iringa, the other major 
city in southern Tanzania), and Kasama and Mpika in Zambia. The final length 
was 1,852 kilometres, or 1,158 miles, to the junction; thus the distance to 
Lusaka is about 1,275 miles. Many observers were skeptical for several years 
as to whether the line would actually be built, and there were rumours that 
the U.S. aid for surfacing the Great North Road was designed to head off con-
17 struction of the railroad. 
TAZARA operates with a separate set of docks in the Dar es Salaam 
harbour used exclusively for Zambia cargo. 
Operations began on a limited scale in October of 1975 when a 
trainload of wheat for NAMBORD reached Kapiri Mposhi as the first cargo. 
Initially there was only one freight train a day with 30 cars, but operations 
were gradually stepped up. In December 1975, 20,000 tons of copper were carried, 
14. A Brookings Institution study was also very critical on the grounds 
of unnecessary duplication. See Haefele and Steinberg,1965. 
15. A good survey of this development is to be found in Hall 1969, 
Chapter 14, and Yu 1971, pp. 1101-15. 
16. For Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority. It is owned jointly by 
the two governments. 
17. Two books have already appeared on TAZARA: Hall and Peyman, 
1976 and Bailey,1976. 
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and in June 1976, 58,000 tons. 3y late 1976, the typical copper traffic was 
42,000 tons a month. In the first 12 months of operation, 350,000 tons of freight 
were carried and 293,000 passengers; in the first 11 months of 1976, 610,000 
tons. The initial capacity, once full scale operations are under way, will be 
two million tons in each direction per year - about twice the present needs of 
Zambia. In recent years slightly under one million tons have moved each way, 
exclusive of the pipeline traffic, which is almost as great as Zambian surface 
imports in tonnage. Ultimately, capacity is planned to reach 4.3 million tons 
each way, and finally 7 million tons. This would require seventeen freight trains 
a day each way. At present five trains per day are operated each way. The entire 
emphasis in this early period has been upon outbound movement of copper and 
inbound movement of bulk shipments, leaving much of the manufactured goods 
traffic to road transport for the moment. Road transport will eventually be 
phased down, but some may be retained. Much of the road transport fleet is near 
the end of its useful life. 
Currently the line is also handling a substantial amount of Zaire 
copper traffic because of the problems with the Benguela. It is expected that 
some Zaire products will continue to move over TAZARA. There is also sub-
stantial traffic within Tanzania, particularly to the Mbeya area. On 14 July 
1976, the road was turned over by the Chinese contractors to the TAZARA authority, 
but about 1,000 Chinese will remain to provide instruction, gradually being 
phased out over the next two years. 
While TAZARA connects with Zambia Railways at Kapiri Mposhi and 
the gauges are the same, immediate free interchange of equipment was impossible. 
Zambia Railways, like the entire network of rail lines of central and southern 
Africa, uses vacuum brakes rather than air brakes, whereas TAZARA equipment uses 
air brakes - as does East African Railways and most other railways in the world. 
Z.R. converted several of its diesels to air brakes and thus has been able to 
bring TAZARA trains to the Copper Belt and to Lusaka. But the cars cannot be 
mixed in trains and substantial traffic has been off loaded on to road trans-
port at Kapiri Mposhi. The intent is ultimately to change entirely to air brake 
operation - but this requires change by the other countries in southern Africa 
as well. 
TAZARA headquarters are in Dar es Salaam and shops are in Dar es 
Salaam and Mpika. 
• ^ r i f f T h e preliminary tariff, to be nspla<Sed in 1977 by a permanent 
ariff, was based upon that of Zambia Railways. Goods are grouped into fourteen 
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classes plus separate mineral and tank car rates. A negotiated rate on copper 
is not included in the tariff. Sample figures are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Sample rates for TAZARA. 
Rates per 1,000 Kilogrammes (Kwacha] 
Dar es Salaam to: Kapiri Mposhi Mbeya 
(1852 KM) (850 KM) 
First class 65.40 42.10 
Fourteenth class 9.58 4.74 
Minerals 8.58 4.25 
Tank car 30.06 19.32 
Copper 42.04 
Note: 1 Kwachar U.S. $1.25 (1977). 
The minerals rate is about 8 mills per U.S. ton mile, which is 
comparable to U.S. rail rates on similar movements. The first class rate is 
about 7 U.S. cents per ton mile. A tapering rate structure is used, though the 
degree of taper varies with the classes. The degree of tapering is much less 
than is typical in the U.S. 
Rates are established for carload minimum weights only, plus a 
separate tariff for parcels. The first class rate is above the Z.T.R.S. 
(Zambia-Tanzania Road Services) rate, but most of the class rates and the special 
rates are lower. There are as yet no joint rates with Zambia Railways, although 
these are expected in time. 
Passenger Service and Fares. Passenger service was commenced almost immediately 
upon the opening of the line. The train left Dar es Salaam at 10.00 in the 
morning, arriving in Mbeya at 9.05 the next morning, Mpika at 11.00 that night, 
and Kapiri at 7.00 the next morning - about 40 hours, averaging little better 
than 20 miles an hour, but with a total of 55 stops. By the end of 1976, two 
trains were being operated; one makes the trip in 36 hours and one in 42 hours. 
The third class fare is Kwacha 6.65 , or about U.S. $8.30 for a 1,100 mile trip. 
The first class fare is Kwacha 28.36, or about U.S. $3 5.00 - extremely cheap by 
comparison with air fares, and a much lower basis than Zambia Railways. Passengers 
must change trains Kapiri; ultimately cars may be run through to Lusaka once the 
problem with the brakes is solved. Zambia Railways has been reluctant to run 
the trains through, partly because of shortages of diesels and partly because 
of questions about crews. 
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Additional Traffic Potential. In addition to the through traffic destined to 
and from the Copper Belt and Lusaka, there is other traffic potential. A truck 
assembly plant is being established at Kasama in northeast Zambia. Considerable 
agricultural product traffic to and from the northeast province is almost certain 
to develop. To Zambia Railways, traffic coming from TAZARA bound for southern 
Zambia and maize traffic coming from the south bound for Tanzania are particularly 
attractive. 
Within Tanzania there are potentials as well. Already the railway 
has taken over traffic from road transport in the Mbeya area. While some claims 
about future effects of the railway upon the Kilombero Valley are exaggerated, 
there is bound to be considerable influence. One of the greatest potentials is 
provided by the coal and iron deposits in the Njombe district if a branch line 
were built from Makumbako via Njome to Liganga. The Njombe area is also important 
agriculturally, particularly in the production of tea. On the other hand, the 
line may spell the doom of E.A.R. '6 Kidatu branch, the previous railhead into the 
Kilombero Valley. 
The possibility of interchange of traffic with East African 
Railways is restricted by two factors, technical and political. TAZARA uses the 
1.067 metre gauge of the southern lines, E.A.R., one metre. It is impossible 
to lay a third rail, as could be done with the standard and three-foot gauge 
lines in the United States, as there is insufficient clearance. There has long 
been discussion of changing E.A.R. to the broader gauge. Currently there is 
considerable discussion of this question in Dar es Salaam, but none at all in 
Nairobi, and it is not impossible that the Tanzanian lines might be changed 
while the Kenya lines are not. The task of changing is not an impossible one 
although some disruption of service would result. Much E.A.R. equipment acquired 
in recent years has been so designed that an equipment change can easily be made. 
The main task is to move one rail out three inches. 
The main obstacle to through traffic, however, is political. The 
greatest potential for trade in the next decade or so is between Kenya and 
Zambia, in view of Kenya's progress in manufacturing in many fields. Even now, 
Kenya has to some extent replaced South Africa as the supplier of processed 
foods, butter, tin cans and other products to the Zambia market. But given the 
unfriendly relations between Kenya and Tanzania, there is little hope of Tanzania's 
encouraging rail interchange. From a longer range standpoint, however, there 
is potential for free movement of commodities among all three countries (and 
possibly Uganda as well). 
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Other Potential Rail Lines 
Given the emphasis placed on rail transport in Central Africa, 
there has been substantial discussion of the building of additional lines, 
although in all likelihood few of these will come to fruition:-
1. A line to connect Lusaka with Malawi Railways at Lilongwe. 
This would facilitate trade between the two countries and give Zambia another 
rail outlet to the sea, although not as good an outlet as TAZARA. 
2. In conjunction with a line to Malawi or built independently, 
a line from Lusaka to the railhead of the Mozambique system near Tete, crossing 
into Mozambique at Feira-Zumbo. This would provide a much more direct outlet to 
Beira than the route via Rhodesia. 
3. The so-called Luso variant, a line extending from the Copper 
Belt through northwestern Zambia to connect with the Benguela at or near Luso, 
thus reducing the distance and avoiding the haul via Zaire. This would also 
facilitate the development of mineral resources in the northwest province of 
Zambia. 
4. As noted above, with an independent Zimbabwe, a direct route 
from Lusaka to Salisbury, crossing the Zambesi at Chirundu where the highway 
crosses. 
5. As noted, an all-rail outlet to the sea in Zaire. 
Conclusion 
Zambia now has a good rail route to the coast, with rates less 
than those which were available for many years (in real terms, the lowest rates 
ever available). TAZARA is capable of handling all import and export traffic 
once full operations are underway, although some traffic will likely continue 
to move by road and other routes once opened will undoubtedly be used to some 
extent. Since the government of Zambia controls the routing of all freight, it 
is in a position to determine routes and methods of transport. The volume of 
traffic on TAZARA will be sufficient, on the basis of studies elsewhere of the 
relationship of volume of traffic>directionally balanced traffic and cost per 
ton mile,to be economically viable and also more economical than road transport, 
although the importance of speed and handling may dictate the routing of some 
traffic via road. 
No studies have been made of the effects of railways upon economic 
development in Zambia, so far as is known, partly because the results have been 
so obvious. Without the railway outlet to the sea, the copper complex in Zambia 
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could not possibly have developed when it did. With high world copper prices, 
it could operate without railroad access today, given a good road to Dar es 
Salaam and present road transport operations and costs. But without the rail-
way in the past th'e development of the industry would have been delayed for 
several decades at least. The significance of the railway for the economy, 
however, has extended far beyond the copper industry. Along the 'line of rail', 
the narrow belt on each side of the railroad, developed commercial agriculture, 
trade and limited manufacturing, while the rest of the country for the most part 
remained in subsistence agriculture. The line of rail became the dominant region 
in the economy of the country, although it had no other particular advantages; 
it just happened to lie in the path of a rail line from 'Victoria Falls to the 
Copper Belt. An estimated 85 per cent of all economic activity in the country 
is in this narrow belt. Over time this small area may lose ground relatively, 
but it is likely to dominate the economy for a long time to come. 
Supplementary Tables 
Table 4 shows the distances to the various ports from Lusaka. The 
distance from Ndola is about 200 miles less via Lobito, 150 miles less via 
Dar es Salaam, and 200 miles greater via Beira. 
Table Distance to various ports from Lusaka. 
Kilometres Miles 
Benguela 2,683 1,678 
Rhodesia Railway and Beira 2,040 1,275 
Malawi and Beira 1,653 1,033 
Malawi and Nacala 1,750 1,093 
Dar es Salaam Road 2,090 1,306 
TAZARA 2,040 1,275 
Mombasa 2,350 1,469 
Table 5 provides samples of rates on copper for export at various 
times. 
Table 5. Transport rates on copper to ports, selected years CKwacha). 
1957 All three ports K 29 .70 
1960 via Rhodesia on portion allowed 
to go via Benguela 
19 .00 
1962 Rail via Rhodesia 30 .67 
1965 Rail via Rhodesia 30 .67 
1967 (Oct.) Rail via Rhodesia 40 .00 
1967 Lobito 42 .20 
1967 Beira via Malawi 54 .20 
1967 Dar es Salaam Road 43 .16 
1967 Dar es Salaam, Air 113 .00 
1968 Road via Dar es Salaam 44 .80 
1968 Via Lobito 45 .81 
1968 Via Rhodesia 45 .98 
1976 Road via Dar es Salaam 54 .00 
1977 Via TAZARA 42 .04 
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COMMONWEALTH WEST AFRICA - NEGLECT AND DETERIORATION 
Of the four Commonwealth West African countries, Gambia has never 
had a railroad, the Sierre Leone system has now been abandoned, and the Ghanaian 
and Nigerian systems have, from all indications, declined substantially in 
importance in their economies - to a much greater extent than in East Africa, 
and in stark contrast to the picture in Central Africa. 
Nigeria 
As the largest country in Africa in terms of population, Nigeria 
has a relatively substantial rail system - a total of 2,178 miles (3,505 kilo-
metres) - but the system's present role in the economy, compared to road trans-
port, is not nearly as great as might be expected. 
The system was an outgrowth of two separate lines, one from Lagos 
and one from Port Harcourt, joining at Kaduna, the British-created capital of 
the former Northern Region. The line was started north from Lagos in 1896, 
reached Ibadan in 1901 and the crossing of the Niger at Jebba in 1909, and in 
1912 it was connected at Minna to the line from Baro on the Niger and completed 
to Kano in 1912. The Port Harcourt line was started northward from that city 
in 1913, reached the coal mines of Enugu in 1916, the Benue River in 1924 
18 
and Kaduna m 1926, with a branch to Jos in 1927. Branches were extended to 
Kauru Namoda from Zaria in 1929, to Nguru from Kano in 1930, and in a major 
construction project from Jos to Maiduguri in Bornu in 1964. One of the serious 
deficiencies is the lack of an east-west line - while passenger trains ran 
through from Lagos to Port Harcourt, for example, on certain days of the week, 
the time was much greater than on a direct route. The primary traffic item has 
been ground nuts moving from the north for export? cola nuts, cotton, timber 
and cattle have been among the other major products moved, plus petroleum 
products and manufactured goods bound for the north. The system originally used 
a small number of Beyer-Garretts, but primarily it relied on 2-8-2 steam locomo-
tives, many built in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1955 all motive power was steam 
(218 line, 55 shunting); by 1974 there were 133 steam and 138 diesel line engines 
and 43 steam and 39 diesel shunting engines. 
While in the early years the system was relatively profitable, 
the earnings subsequently became somewhat erratic. In the 1955-65 period, the 
operating ratio ranged from 81 (1955-61 to 113 (1965-66), averaging 96 (Prest 
1969, p. 97) . The figure was .107 in 1970 and 138 in 1972-73. From 1959 on, a 
A 2 foot 6 inch gauge line was built from Zaria to Jos in 1914 to 
serve the tin mines. This was abandoned in 1957, since the Jos area was served 
more effectively by the main line. 
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loss was incurred after interest but before taxes in every year except 1963-64; 
the deficit was Naira 6.9 million in 1965-66, Naira 10.3 million in 1969-70 and 
Naira 23.1 million in 1973-74 (Nigeria, Third National Development Plan, 1975, 
19 pp. 214). 
As shown in Table 6, the decline in traffic has been substantial; 
from a peak of around three million tons in the early 1960s, the figure fell by 
more than half by 1971-72, recovered somewhat following the end of the Biafran 
war, but was about one third less in 1973-74 than in 1961-62. The declines in 
tonnage and ton miles have been comparable. Passenger traffic has fallen sharply 
from 11.0 million in 1961-62 to 4.7 million in 1973-74, but passenger miles, 
while falling after 1970, were greater in 1974 than in the early 1960s. The 
freight traffic in 1973-74 was 439,853 net ton miles per mile, a relatively low 
figure. The average length of haul is about 600 miles. The freight revenue 
was about 3 U.S. cents per ton mile in 1972. 
Table 6. Net ton miles for Nigerian Railways, 1960-1974. 
Year Ended 31 March Net Ton Miles 
(thousands I 
1960 1,249,840 
1961 1,181,101 
1962 1,412,165 
1963 1,410,950 
1964 1,554,793 
1965 1,221,025 
1966 1,215,058 
1967 1,004,000 
1968 986,000 
1969 1,094,000 
1970 950,147 
1971 981,793 
1972 750,129 
1973 844,000 
1974 958,000 
Source: Nigeria, Annual Abstract of Statistics 1972, Federal Office of Statistics 
1975. 
The Third National Development Plan issued in 1975 provides a 
detailed analysis of the decline in traffic and increasing operating deficits 
(apart from the effects of the Biafran war). This has been brought about by 
a decline in agricultural production, particularly for export, which was a major 
source of traffic; a sharp decline in coal production; and deterioration in rail 
19. 1 Naira = U.S. $1.50. 
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transport services. As stated in the Development Plan:-
In fact, for the past ten years the volume of traffic moved 
by rail has been limited by the Railways' capacity to carry 
it. The Railways have even lost considerable long distance 
bulk traffic to the roads in spite of the fact that they 
would carry this for a lower charge and at a lower cost to 
the country's economy. This situation is largely attributable 
to the unreliability, slowness and inadequacy of Railway 
goods transport services. 
Several factors have been responsible for this: 
1. Unbalanced traffic, with greater up than down traffic. 
2. Rapid decline in wagon Cfreight car] utilisation due 
to inadequately co-ordinated scheduling of car use. 
3. A large proportion of time out for repairs for both steam 
and diesel locomotives. In 1974, availability times were 
only 17 per cent for steam locomotives and 54 per cent for 
diesels. In general, usable motive power is entirely 
inadequate. 
4. Slow train speeds, due to the excessive curvature and 
inadequate track maintenance. The maximum speed allowed 
anywhere on the system is 40 miles per hour, and 
restrictions as low as 10 miles an hour are common. 
5. Inadequate communications, due in part to constant 
thievery of the copper wire of the communications lines. 
Road transport has increased substantially at the expense of the 
railroad, including long distance transport from the north. There has been 
little restriction on road transport and weight limits have-,not been enforced. 
The increased road transport has added seriously to traffic hazards and congestion 
(the two roads from Ibadan to Lagos are regarded as death traps by many drivers), 
but the government has pushed its investment in roads and the railway has been 
relatively neglected. 
In the Third Development Plan a major overhaul of the railway 
system was proposed, involving essentially the construction of a completely new 
system to standard (4'8.5") gauge, serving the same points as the present 
system and built parallel to it, to be phased in gradually. The plans call for 
building about 320 kilometres per year, and thus will not be completed until 
well into the 1980s. About Naira 885 million was allocated to the rail system 
for 1975-80 out of a total of Naira 4 billion for transport, and from this 
-•aira 714 million will be allocated to the first stage of the new system. 
- eanwhile, some basic improvements will be made to the present system and a 
new rail commuter service in the Lagos area will be established. 
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The plans are based upon a study by consultants completed in 1973. 
The government is convinced that, given potential growth in the economy, 
improved rail service will cost less than primary reliance on road transport. 
Whether the proposed system will in fact be carried to completion remains to be 
seen. 
Ghana 
Ghana Railways has suffered much the same fate as Nigerian Rail-
ways. The system is essentially A-shaped, lines extending from the ports of 
Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra northward and northwestward, respectively, joining 
at Kumasi. These two lines in turn are linked by an east-west line paralleling 
the coast, permitting relatively direct service between Accra and Secondi. The 
western line was started northward from Sekondi in 1898, primarily to facilitate 
gold mining in the area around Tarkwa, reaching that city in 1901 and Kumasi in 
1903, 168 miles from the ocean. In 1909 a line was started north from Accra to 
Kumasi, but did not reach there until 1923. The total distance Accra—Sekondi 
was 363 miles. A long branch was built from the Tarkwa area to Kade, completed 
in 1927, and this was connected to the Accra-Kumasi line in 1956. Like Nigerian 
Railways, 3 foot 6 inch gauge is used. Dieselisation began in 1954 and has 
continued slowly. 
The main line of the system is the western line, Takoradi to 
Kumasi, 171 miles, which handles about 90 per cent of all the traffic. The 
eastern line, from Accra and the port of Tema to Kumasi, is 214 miles in 
length. The central line, which connects the other two is 120 miles. There 
are three branches,to Prestea in the west, to Awaso in the northwest, which 
handles the bauxite traffic, and to Kade in central Ghana. Total length is 
592 miles (953 kilometres). 
Total traffic in the early 1970s was about 1.7 million tons and 
190 million ton miles (1970), but 90 per cent of this is concentrated on the 
western line, to give this line a reasonably high ton mi/mi figure of about one 
million. The rest of the system handles only 200,000 tons, with a ton mi/mi 
figure of 45,000 - low by any standards. Over 90 per cent of the traffic is 
southbound, and about 90 per cent of the revenue comes from four commodities -
cocoa, timber, manganese and bauxite. Most of the imports and manufactured 
goods traffic is by road. The operating ratio averaged 89 from 1958 to 1964, 
but was increasing. 
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Marginal cost per ton mileage has been estimated at0,86 np for 
20 
direct train operating costs and 2.36 np overall. These figures were equal 
to about 0.8 U.S. cents and 2.0 U.S. cents respectively, given exchange rates 
of the period. The rate structure has provided relatively high rates on manu-
factured goods traffic and on cocoa, the principal export crop, and very low 
rates on bauxite, designed to make the Ghanaian bauxite, competitive in world 
markets. About 7 million passengers were being carried per year in the early 
1970s for an average trip of 40 miles; 98 per cent of the passenger traffic was 
third class. 
The general picture of the system since independence has been 
one of deterioration, despite some improvements. There has been very substantial 
loss of traffic to road transport. For example, at one time all cocoa was hauled 
by rail; by 1966, 30 per cent was moving by road and by the early 1970s, nearly 
half (Vickrey 1971, pp. 28-46). The high rate for cocoa - NC 12.51 per ton -' k 
was 50 per cent greater than the cost of hauling by road of NC 8 CVickrey 1971, 
p. 46). The shift to road transport was also encouraged by the substantial 
ownership of lorries by the cocoa buying agents and by the inability of the 
railroad to handle all of the traffic offered. This limited capacity was also 
an important factor leading to the loss of other export traffic as welljparticu-
larly of logs. Inadequate funds were provided for new equipment, and equipment 
maintenance was often neglected. The result has been continuing loss of traffic. 
An inherent source of difficulty is the relatively short haul - the maximum is 
about 200 miles. Thus road transport has important advantages. 
The problem of rail transport in Ghana has not gone unnoticed by 
the government. Around 1970, funds were provided for new equipment and improved 
signalling, particularly to increase capacity". In 1969-70, a major study was 
undertaken of the entire transport sector by Robert Nathan Associates (Nathan 
Consortium for Sector Studies,1970). 
A detailed study of the rate structure by Edward Vickrey, using 
Nathan data, concluded that much of the difficulty lay in the use of rates that 
were far in excess of cost for cocoa, somewhat excessive for logs and manganese, 
and far too low for bauxite (and passenger traffic). At the same time, rates 
for northbound manufactured goods and other imported goods were greatly in excess 
of the appropriate cost figures on this backhaul traffic, for which only short 
run marginal cost is relevant. Thus substantial rate reductions were proposed; 
much of the traffic loss, in Vickrey's view, was attributable to rates that were 
far too high relative to road transport costs and actual rail costs (1971). 
20• Ed. note: np = new pesewa; 100 np = NC (new cedil; as of September 
1973, U.S. $1=NC 1.54. 
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What is the long range potential? The evidence suggests that 
on the heavy traffic western line rail costs (not existing rail rates) are less 
than road costs, so that the rail line should be maintained and improved in 
order to handle the available traffic. But the eastern line has so little traffic 
that it is uneconomic; all Kumasi traffic can easily be handled on the western 
line. The central line, despite low traffic at present, has greater future 
potential for transporting bauxite to the refinery at Tema. The refinery has 
thus far operated primarily with Jamaican bauxite, but under the terms of the 
agreement with Ghana the company is committed to phase in use of Ghanaian 
bauxite. 
There are several related issues. Unlike the situation in many 
developing countries, road users as a whole are apparently generating enough 
revenue to more than cover road maintenance costs. However, there is little 
good information on the relative burdens of large vehicles, and there is con-
siderable evidence that heavy lorries are causing substantial destruction to the 
roads, particularly in the handling of logs. Vickrey has noted incidentally 
that rail costs have been artificially inflated by the success of a strong union 
in pushing up wages, although reduced somewhat below opportunity costs by ex-
change control regulations. One other problem of the system is the seasonal 
nature of the cocoa traffic, resulting in a need for more equipment than other-
wise would be required. 
In 1976 the government of Ghana began to take action to improve 
the situation. The 1976 budget provided NC 20 million (about the same number 
of dollars at current fixed exchange rates] for new freight cars and engines, 
and the government obtained World Bank assistance for a study of transport 
requirements. The general philosophy of the government is to retain the rail 
system, or at least much of it, for the handling of bulk commodities. There 
is little thought, apparently, that much of the manufactured goods traffic can 
appropriately be returned to rail. 
There has long been discussion of extending the railway about 
2 50 miles north from Kumasi to Tamale, the major city in northern Ghana and the 
centre of an important agricultural area. However, the severe shortage of 
roreign exchange restricts improvement and expansion of the system. 
Sierra Leone 
While other West African commonwealth countries have witnessed 
-ne decline of their rail systems, Sierra Leone has, under pressure from the 
•orId Bank, phased out its 311-mile system altogether. 
42 IDS/DP 257 
43 - IDS7DP 257 
Construction started from the Freetown area in 1896, reached 
Bo, the second largest city, in 1903 , and pushed rapidly on to Baiima in 1905 
and Pendembu in 1908 - 225 miles from Freetown. At the time, this was one 
of the longest railways in tropical Africa, A branch was completed to Makemi 
in 1914. 
The line was built for reasons of economy with 35 pound rail to 
a 2 foot 6 inch gauge, miniature by any standards. Much of the line traversed 
mountainous country, with numerous bridges and grades, A number of Beyer-
Garretts were used, the later ones weighing 66 tons. Palm kernels and chrome 
ore provided most of the traffic. The road was a source of operating losses 
over most of its history. In the period 1959-1964, for example, the operating 
ratio averaged 145 - expenses of operation were nearly 50 per cent greater 
than revenues. Finally, under strong World Bank pressure tied to grants for 
highway improvement, the government, despite considerable opposition, agreed 
to phase out the system. This began In 1968, though the main portion from 
Kenema via Bo to Freetown was retained until late in 1974, 
Distinct from this line was a 52-mile line from a point on the 
river above Freetown to the iron mines at Marampa which was completed in 1933. 
The closing of the mines in 1976 leaves the future of this line in doubt. 
Cameroon and Gabon 
While this paper deals primarily with the Commonwealth countries, 
brief mention will be given to two ex-French areas, Cameroon and Gabon. .One 
of the major railroad projects in Africa In the last decade, second only to 
21 
TAZARA, was the building of the Transcameroon Railway- Cameroon was a German 
colony prior to the First World War, and the Germans began to plan construction 
of rail lines as early as 1902, The first line was built In the north between 
1906 and 1911 from a point across the river from Douala Lo Nkongsamba, about 
100 miles. The most important potential route, however, was the central line 
between Douala, the main port»and Yaounde, the capital. Construction was started 
m 1908 on this route, planned ultimately to reach Chad and to cross the 
continent to link with the Tanganyika lines. The line reached Eseka in 1914, 
but all construction was stopped by the war. The French began extending the 
line after the war, but it did not reach Yaounde until 1927- The French made 
plans for further expansion, but no development, beyond converting the Mbalmayo 
This is described in detail in a publication of the Ministry of 
Transport of Cameroon (1974). 
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branch from 0.6 metre to 1.0 metre gauge in 1933, was accomplished before the 
Depression and then the Second Warld War stopped further work. In 1955 a 
bridge across the Wouri River was completed to join the northern and central 
lines. After independence, with financial aid from the United States, the 
European Economic Community, West Germany and France, the line was started 
northward from Yaound£ in 1964 and reached Ngaoudere in 1974, an extension 
of 622 kilometres (390 miles]. This is a well built one-metre gauge line; 
the daily passenger train makes the run in eleven hours - very good for passenger 
service in Africa, considering the number of stops. 
The great problem facing the system, however, is the old Douala-
Yaoundelink, over which traffic for the new line must flow. This 308-kilometre 
segment has 730 curves, many very sharp, and severe grades and numerous bridges. 
It is an impressive line through very difficult terrain, but it is entirely 
inadequate to handle the traffic and numerous derailments are occurring. Plans 
are underway for substantial reconstruction. The present capacity is only about 
1.2 million tons a year. 
The system as a whole is handling about 1.2 million tons or 
325 million ton-kilometres (about 223 million ton-miles] per year, about 305,000 
ton-miles per mile. Of the total, the northern line carries only about 
150,000 tons. The traffic on the system in 1972-73 was concentrated in a 
number of categories as shown in Table 7. Thus timber, aluminum products and 
petroleum provide the bulk of the traffic, followed by manufactured goods and 
major food items. Road transport competition is not serious on most of the 
systems. 
Table 7. Traffic on the Transcameroon Railway, 1972-73. 
Commodity Tons Ton-kilometres 
000s 000,000s 
Timber - 282 98 
Aluminum ore 128 11 
Aluminum ingots and sheets 45 33 
Fuel 112 43 
Building materials 62 21 
Merchandise 97 31 
Cocoa 56 17 
Bananas 48 5 
Coffee 32 6 
North Cameroon transit traffic 37 22 
Wine and soft drinks 42 7 
Source: Cameroon 1975, p. 51. 
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About two million passengers are carried per year. The system 
is entirely dieselised, and diesel rail cars are used for passenger service. 
The major current project is in Gabon, which adjoins Cameroon 
on the south. Work was started in 1975, linking the ports of Owendo and 
Santa Clara via Booue with Franceville, where there are manganese deposits. 
The line will also be extended to Belinga, where there are iron ore deposits. 
The line, ultimately 930 kilometres,will cross virtually the entire country. 
The portion to Franceville is expected to be completed by 1980 and the entire 
system by 1985. 
Major reconstruction of the Congo-Brazzaville line, connecting 
Brazzaville through mountainous country with the port of Pointe Noire, is 
being carried out by an Italian firm. 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ISSUES 
Table 8 summarises the traffic data of all the systems covered 
in this paper. The costs, converted to cents per ton-mile, should be regarded 
as only very rough figures because of the artificiality of the rates of ex-
change in many instances. 
Table 8. Summary of traffic and costs of six African rail systems. 
Approximate 
Net Ton-Miles Cost per Net 
per Mile of Ton-Mile 
Line 
000s US cents 
Railroad Mileage Year 
East Africa 
entire system 
Nairobi-Mombasa 
Tanzania Central 
Zambia 
TAZARA 
Nigeria 
Ghana 
entire system 
western line 
other lines 
Cameroon 
3 ,663 
330. 
530c 
650 
1,158 
2,178 
592 
171 
421 
730 
1975 
1975 
1977 
1974 
1970 
1973 
7?1 
8,500 gross 
2,700 gross 
2,190 
2,000b 
440 
170 
1,000 
45 
305 
2.5 
4.6 
i n.a. 
3 
a. Dar es Salaam-Tabora portion. 
b. Estimated. Capacity is about twice this great. 
c. Likely around 2 cents. Existing road transport Zambia to Dar es Salaam 
estimated at 5.3 cents. 
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Conclusions 
Out of this brief survey a number of general conclusions can be 
drawn. 
1. The volume of traffic on the main lines - Mombasa-Kampala, 
Tanzania Central, Zambia, TAZARA, the western line of Ghana Railways and 
portions of the Nigerian system - is adequate to allow these lines to be run 
economically. Studies in the United States indicate that many economies are 
attained at one million net ton-miles per -mile (roughly two million gross), 
and most at two million, even though full economies are not attained until 
traffic reaches about ten million (twenty million gross) (Harris, 1976). 
2. The cost per ton mile would appear to be lower on the main 
lines than the cost of heavy volume road transport, but road transport services 
have obtained substantial traffic, partly because of inadequate railway 
equipment and partly because of the value-of-service rate structures of the rail-
ways . 
3. A much better picture of relative rail and road costs will 
be available after a few years of experience with TAZARA, which is replacing 
heavy volume road transport. 
4. There is a substantial mileage, in East Africa and Ghana, 
of relatively light traffic lines - with traffic under 100,000 net ton-miles 
per mile. Experience in the United States shows that such lines have sub-
stantially higher costs than main lines and that road transport is cheaper in 
such cases. 
5. While all of the systems have survived dramatic readjustments 
in recent decades, they have all (except Zambia Railways) suffered from general 
deterioration in the last few years for a number of reasons: governmental 
emphasis on road development, shortages of equipment due to lack of foreign 
exchange and governmental neglect, loss of traffic to road transport because 
of obsolete tariff structures and other reasons and in some instances lack of 
trained personnel. 
6. General attitudes toward the railways differ widely among 
the countries surveyed, from acute neglect in West Africa to strong emphasis 
in Zambia. In Central Africa, broadly defined - including Zambia, Zaire, 
Angola and Mozambique- the railway remains the dominant transport form, in 
part in some areas because of the lack of inter-city roads. 
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7. The initial railway tariffs were designed to obtain as much 
revenue as possible from 'luxury' imports and from exports of primary products, 
allowing low rates on exports of low-value commodities and imports of items 
regarded as necessary for development. The structures did not universally favour 
exports as is commonly argued - witness the high rates on copper from Zambia 
and on cocoa in Ghana. Of the imports, in some instances particularly heavy 
rates were placed on petroleum products. One consequence of this value-of-
service type of tariff structure was the loss of traffic to road transport as 
roads were built. Readjustment of the tariffs in light of changing conditions 
has been slow. 
8. Political considerations have played a major role in railway 
development. As is well known, the political problems of southern Africa resulted 
in dramatic shifts in traffic patterns; the political difficulties among the 
three East African countries have seriously injured East African Railways. 
9. From the various studies that have been made, it is clear that 
the early railway lines had a major impact upon economic development and the 
shaping of modern locational patterns; Nairobi, in some respects the most 
important city in tropical Africa, owes its existence to the railway. But there 
is now clear evidence that under present conditions the building of railway 
lines may have little impact upon development, particularly of agriculture, 
since road transport is adequate on relatively light traffic lines and rail costs 
are no lower, and may be even higher, than road transport costs. 
10. The importance of petroleum products in total transport is 
very great. The tonnage of petroleum products imported into Zambia by pipeline 
is about the same as all surface transport import tonnage. For years East 
African Railways has received about 25 per cent of its revenue from petroleum 
traffic; much of this will be lost with the opening of the pipeline. 
11. Air transport of freight has proven very costly, and while 
important in some instances, has not expanded rapidly. 
12. Passenger traffic on the railways has changed little in recent 
years; loss of higher-income and tourist traffic to air and road transport has 
seen offset by increased total passenger travel. Third class service dominates 
the traffic completely today at fares that are extremely low by comparison with 
other countries. 
- 48 - IDS/DP 257 
Major Policy Issues 
The African countries covered in this survey face several policy 
issues in the transport field. 
1. Should new rail lines be built? As suggested above, there 
are probably relatively few instances in which new lines are warranted. One is 
to allow development of mineral products providing a substantial volume of 
traffic. The other is to provide better routes where existing traffic is high -
as in the case of TAZARA and the possible connection of Zambia Railways with 
those of Malawi and Mozambique. 
2. Should existing rail lines be preserved? The answer appears 
to be clearly in the affirmative so far as the main lines are concerned - partly 
because costs are lower than those of road transport at existing levels and partly 
because failure to do so would result in such an increased level of road transport 
that it would precipitate the rapid destruction of the roads. In other words, 
there is reason to believe that heavy road transport does not pay adequately 
to cover the damage it does to roads. Taxes on diesel fuel are typically low 
according to the argument that low rates aid economic development. To build roads 
to adequate standards to allow heavy volume road transport without prohibitive 
maintenance costs would add tremendously to government costs in this sector. 
From all indications, preservation and improvement of the heavy-density rail 
lines will be much more economical. 
Doubts can be raised, however, about some of the longer light-
traffic lines, whose high costs per ton-mile raise overall costs and drain the 
resources of the railway system. But premature abandonment of a line before 
roads have been developed and before opportunities for economic development 
have been fully explored may be even more unwise. 
A substantial portion of the mileage may be more or less marginal. 
In comparison of rail and road costs for purposes of determining economic 
viability of these lines, it is important that true opportunity costs, not simply 
monetary costs be used. On the one hand, costs for which road transport is res-
ponsible but for which it does not pay (additional road costs above those covered 
by user charges) must be included. Relative drain on foreign exchange at 
artificially maintained exchange rates should be considered, as well as future 
relative energy costs, particularly in countries lacking petroleum. The railway 
is a more efficient user of fuel if traffic is above a relatively low level; if 
total traffic is no more than a few cars per train, road transport is more 
efficient. 
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Another element to consider is the artificial inflation of railway 
wages in some countries due to strong unions and the previous employment of non-
Africans. Road transport, especially with owner-operators, is not subject to 
this effect. The economic cost of railway labour is not the actual wages paid 
but the opportunity cost - what these workers could earn in another occupation -
and this is often much lower. 
3. When railroads are retained, how can an optimal balance 
between road and rail transport be attained? First, as noted, tariff structures 
have resulted in uneconomic diversion of traffic from rail to road in many 
instances; a shift away from value-of-service to cost-related tariffs is obviously 
required as is recognised in most of the countries. 
Secondly, experience in other countries suggests that for a 
substantial volume of traffic costs of shipping by rail and road, considering 
not only transport costs but speed, handling and loss and damage elements, are 
much the same. Should governments seek to ensure that this traffic moves by 
rail rather than by road by restrictive licensing or other means in order to 
lower rail costs per ton-mile and avoid deficits? There is obviously some merit 
in doing so. But the policy is difficult to implement and can easily be overdone, 
forcing traffic to move by rail when road is far more efficient. In some African 
countries in which much of the traffic is controlled by marketing boards and 
parastatal enterprises, it is relatively easy to ensure that this marginal traffic 
is moved by rail. But in more broadly free enterprise economies, attempts to 
restrict road transport by licensing are not likely to be successful; the rules 
are difficult to enforce and firms will develop their own road transport fleets 
- a practice few countries seek to curtail. 
In general the best measures to ensure a reasonably efficient 
division of traffic appear to be the following:-
a. Revision of tariffs to reflect cost rather than value of 
service, 
b. A policy that all government enterprises use rail rather 
than road when costs are comparable, 
c. Establishment of reasonable weight limits on road trans-
port and enforcement of them, 
d. Adequate charges on road transport for road use, and 
e. Outright subsidy by government of rail transport in certain 
instances Cfor example, to cover the costs of a line retained 
for regional development purposes or of passenger service if 
the government seeks to make cheap passenger transport avail-
able) rather than requiring the rail systems to cover all costs 
from revenue. 
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